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Abstract This paper uses generational accounts to analyse the long term sus-
tainability of Belgian public finances. We derive age-profiles of detailed tax and
expenditure categories from micro data and microsimulation models, and plug them
into a long run demographic projection. We assess fiscal long term sustainability
under current fiscal and budgetary policy for the base year 2010, and perform
simulations of counterfactuals to determine the relative contribution of the most
important factors of the long run unsustainability. This update of the generational
accounts for Belgium shows that, not unexpectedly, the budgetary situation in
Belgium violates the intertemporal budget constraint and hence is unsustainable in
the long run. The current level of explicit debt, however, only plays a minor role in
explaining this sustainability problem. Ageing and the related increase in age related
expenditures are the main drivers of the long run fiscal imbalance and the high level
of implicit debt. We disentangle the Belgian generational accounts into their
regional components and show that the major explanation for regional differences in
generational accounts is not divergent demographic projections, but the wide dif-
ferences in socio-economic situations, as revealed by the region specific age-
profiles.
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1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis, the public at large in
European countries has been battered with alarming quotes about widening deficits,
rising debt to GDP ratio’s, unsustainability of public finances, and ever more harsh
austerity plans. Belgium is not an exception to this general picture. As in many other
countries, the (partial) transformation of the private debt overhang into sovereign
debt, caused a U-turn in the time-path of the budgetary situation of Belgium. The
fiscal deficit and debt level forecasts for 2012 are respectively -3.1 and 100.5 %
(AMECO 2012). Also the long overdue agreement on the budget 2012 (finalized in
December 2011) was framed within immediate revisions (March 2012) due to
disappointing realisations. It certainly would be an understatement that these fiscal
imbalances would not get enough attention.
Precisely these urgent worries about cyclical and short term problems in the fiscal
stance of countries, threaten to conceal the long term picture of structural and long
term fiscal imbalances. The more ‘‘because the factors contributing to short-term
debt accumulation differ substantially from those that will affect debt accumulation
over the longer term’’ (Auerbach 2011 p. 1). This is where the analysis of this paper
comes to the fore. It does not fit in a short term framework, but analyses the long
term sustainability of the Belgian public finances by applying the method of
generational accounting on the data of 2010.
Generational accounting has been introduced by Auerbach et al. (1991) as an
alternative way of looking at the fiscal stance of countries. They launched the
methodology as a response to the shortcomings of deficit accounting. The main
criticism against the use of the current deficit as a measure of fiscal sustainability of
government finances is that it focuses exclusively on the annual flows of
expenditures and receipts. The obvious example is a change in legislation which
increases (or decreases) future pension entitlements. This policy choice will not
show up in the current deficit, but might seriously affect long run fiscal prospects.
Generational accounts are precisely designed to take into account the effects of
policies on current and future generations. They report, in present value, the amount
of net taxes a representative member of each generation will have to pay during his
or her remaining lifetime, given fiscal and social policy of the base year.
Actually, two different types of generational accounts can be constructed: ‘‘rest
of life’’ generational accounts, which evaluate the remaining net taxes a
representative member of each cohort will have to pay for the rest of his or her
life, and ‘‘life cycle’’ generational accounts, which not only take the remaining net
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taxes into account, but also net taxes paid in the past. In this paper we only develop
and calculate ‘‘rest of life’’ generational accounts.
The first international comparison of generational accounts and their accompa-
nying sustainability indicators are Auerbach et al. (1999) and Raffelhu¨schen (1999a,
b). Both studies provide a detailed description of the generational accounting
methodology and illustrate this on multiple countries. As far as Belgium is
concerned, Auerbach et al. (1999) and Raffelhu¨schen (1999a, b) conclude that the
unsustainability of public finances is not considerably different from the one found
in other countries. In the last decades, several other generational accounting studies
have been published for many countries. Hagist (2008) provides an overview of the
most recent studies of 28 different countries using generational accounts to assess
the fiscal situation. However, despite this presence of multiple studies for individual
countries, there is a lack of recent studies that actually compare generational
accounts at an international level, like Auerbach et al. (1999) and Raffelhu¨schen
(1999a, b). The most recent study that compares generational accounts and the fiscal
outlook in several countries is Hagist et al. (2009a, b).1
Generational accounts are not uncontroversial. Haveman (1994) summarizes the
most important criticisms and limitations. Firstly, generational accounts are
calculated under the assumption of the persistence of current policy. But
governments will definitely change taxation, spending and borrowing policy in
response to changes in the economic, social and political environment. Haveman
(1994) argues that this is not the government which appears on the scene of
generational accounting. A second criticism concerns the sensitivity of the estimates
to the discount and growth rates used in the intertemporal calculations. To overcome
this, to a certain extent arbitrary, choice, most generational accounting studies
conduct sensitivity analyses. Anyhow, Auerbach et al. (1994) admit that the use of a
constant discount rate is an oversimplification and that the methodology can be
improved in this respect. A third comment concerns the lack of behavioural change.
The method of generational accounting does not allow for consumption or labour
supply responses to taxes and transfers reflected in the accounts, let alone more
general macro-economic interactions between sectors and/or general equilibrium
effects. As such, the calculation of generational accounts is a purely arithmetic
exercise and fully respects its designation as generational ‘accounting’. In addition
to that, standard generational accounting studies do not make any normative
statements in which the welfare of current and future generations is traded-off in an
elaborate and explicit ethical framework of intergenerational justice.
It is not surprising therefore that generational accounting has never succeeded in
replacing the current budget deficit as the main focus of sound fiscal policies. Yet,
even Haveman concludes his critical review in a nuanced way: ‘The idea of tracking
the monetary effect of fiscal policy measures on representative members of all
present and future age groups is enormously attractive. Indeed, what legislator or
economist—indeed, what citizen—would not desire such information? In principle,
1 They analyse the long term fiscal sustainability of Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Germany,
France, United Kingdom and the United States.
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a version of generational accounts could be a valuable public finance tool’
(Haveman 1994, p. 106).
This also summarizes our own motivation to update the Belgian generational
accounts. The most recent ones date back to more than a decade ago: Stijns (1999)
and Dellis and Lu¨th (1999) with 1995 as base year, and Lie´geois (2001) who derives
generational accounts for Belgium in the context of a computable general
equilibrium model.2 In the course of the update, we have improved the quality of
the calculations of the Belgian generational accounts by introducing some new
elements. The first, and most important one, is the use of microdata and
microsimulation models to derive age profiles for the most important taxes and
benefits. We also use microsimulation models to simulate the effect of higher
employment rates on the generational accounts. Secondly, we disentangle the
Belgian generational accounts into regional accounts for Flanders, Wallonia and
Brussels. Finally, we investigate the main determinants of the long term
unsustainability of Belgian public finances, by simulating counterfactuals such as
the removal of initial debt, of ageing, or of rising health-care expenditures.
These updated generational accounts and the sustainability indicators derived
from them, will allow us to compare our results with other recent studies which
gauge the sustainability of Belgian public finances. Saintrain (2010) calculates,
among other things, a sustainability indicator which reflects the permanent and
immediate increase in the primary balance in order to reach sustainable public
finances in the long run. His indicator is similar to the S2-indicator, frequently used
by the European Commission in their yearly sustainability reports (European
Commission 2010). Both studies conclude that public finances are not sustainable in
the long run and primary balances have to adjust by respectively 6.2 and 6.5
percentage points of GDP. Both studies do not rely on micro statistics but use a
macro model to estimate future receipts and expenditures of the government. This
makes the comparison of the degree of unsustainability obtained in this macro
framework, with the results from our generational accounting framework all the
more interesting. Also Auerbach (2011) and Raffelhu¨schen and Moog (2011) look
at the Belgian fiscal situation. They use the OECD- methodology to assess fiscal
sustainability, a method which also differs in some ways from the generational
accounting method.3 They obtain results in line with Saintrain (2010) and the
European Commission (2010). Needless to say that we consider our paper not as a
substitute for these recent assessments, but as a valuable complement based on a
different methodological framework and essentially using microdata.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 starts with a brief
discussion of the generational accounting methodology and some sustainability
indicators. Section 3 reports the data requirements and sources which have been
2 Cattoir and Docquier (2004) also calculate generational accounts for Belgium for the year 1999.
However, they use the methodology for a very different purpose since they try to find a new debt-sharing
rule between seceding regions and do not consider the issue of sustainability of public finances.
3 There are two main differences. First, the projection of non-age related expenditures differs
substantially from the generational accounting method and secondly, the OECD method works with a
finite time horizon. For a detailed comparison of the OECD method and the Generational accounting
methodology, see Benz and Fetzer (2006).
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used and Sect. 4 presents the generational accounts and sustainability indicators at
the Belgian level for base year 2010. We also determine the important factors of
unsustainability by means of the simulation of counterfactuals, such as a higher
employment rate of elderly workers in Belgium. In Sect. 5 we briefly discuss the
decomposition of the regionalized generational accounts and look more in detail at
the different effects of demographic changes in the three regions. The last section
concludes.
2 Generational accounting and sustainability
In this section we briefly present the methodology of generational accounting and
the sustainability indicators we derive from it. For a more detailed discussion, we
refer the reader to Decoster et al. (2011).
Denoting the level of debt at the end of period t by Bt, the primary balance of
period t by PBt, and the discount rate, assumed to be constant, by r, the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government, from which sustainability
indicators will be derived, can be written as:
Bt ¼
X1
s¼tþ1
PBs
1 þ rð Þst: ð1Þ
It states that the current level of debt (in period t) has to be covered by all future
primary surpluses (or deficits). Indicators of the unsustainability of public finances
gauge the extent in which (1) is violated.
The link with a generational accounting framework is obtained by decomposing
the primary balance of each period, PBs, into contributions of different cohorts
living in that period, and then re-aggregating this decomposition according to
cohort. With k referring to the birth year of a cohort, we denote the primary balance
of all members of cohort or generation k at time s by PBs,k. This cohort-specific
primary balance consists of the contribution of generation k to government revenues
in the form of payments of income, corporate and indirect taxes and social security
contributions on the one hand, and the benefits this generation k enjoys in the form
of government expenditures such as public goods, family allowances, health care
expenditures, replacement incomes (unemployment benefits, pensions, …) etc.
Adding-up all these contributions and benefits over the remaining lifetime of all
members of generation k and expressing it in present value at time t, leads to:
Nt;k ¼
X1
s¼tþ1
PBs;k
1 þ rð Þst: ð2Þ
We call Nt,k the net tax payments of cohort k.
A generational accounting exercise makes projections of these primary balances,
PBs,k’s, in each future period for each cohort. The assumptions, on which these
projections are based, are expressed in terms of per capita tax payments and per
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capita expenditures in each period. We therefore write the total primary balance
PBs,k as:
PBs;k ¼ ss;k  Ps;k; ð3Þ
where ss,k refers to the per capita net payment in period s of a representative
individual from cohort k living in period s, and Ps,k denotes the number of people of
cohort k still alive at time s. The latter factor, Ps,k, is the demographic input of the
model and is obtained from demographic projections.
The projection of the first factor on the RHS of (3), the net per capita tax payment
ss,k for future generations, is based on the assumption that the per capita tax
payment of a currently living age-cohort is informative of the per capita net tax
payment of a future cohort when this future cohort will have reached the same age.
The cohort born in period k has age a = s - k in period s. The assumption
underlying the projection can then be expressed as:
ss;k ¼ st;tðskÞ  ð1 þ xÞst
¼ st;ta  ð1 þ xÞst
ð4Þ
where the second factor is introduced to have the net tax payments growing with the
real rate of productivity growth x.4 Expression (4) highlights the crucial assumption
underlying generational accounting applications: all information on future next tax
payments (ss,k) is derived from net tax payments in base period t for different age
groups living in this base period. These st,t-a’s are the so-called age-profiles of taxes
and expenditures.
In practice net tax ss,k is disaggregated into n different revenue and expenditure
categories such as personal income taxes, social security contributions, indirect
taxes, capital taxes, corporate taxes, unemployment benefits, pensions, child
benefits, health-care, general public goods, etc. Denoting each element with the
subscript i we have:
ss;k ¼
Xn
i¼1
ss;k;i; ð5Þ
with an age profile for each specific ss,k,i.
5 We retrieve these age profiles of different
tax and benefit components from microdata to microsimulation models, as described
in Sect. 3.
A generational account, GAt,k, is defined as the average net payment during the
remaining lifetime of an individual of cohort k. The average is obtained by dividing
the net tax payments of cohort k over the whole time span t up to T by the number of
individuals of that cohort k (Pt,k):
4 Productivity gains affect both the absolute level of future age-specific tax payments and transfer
receipts. However, the purpose of generational accounting is not to forecast these productivity effects.
The literature assumes that both age-specific taxes and transfers grow with a constant and time invariant
productivity growth rate x.
5 Note that each specific age profile grows over time according to the constant productivity growth rate x.
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GAt;k ¼ Nt;k
Pt;k
: ð6Þ
The generational account of a newborn in period t, GAt,t, will be of special
importance because it will be used to calculate the generational imbalance.
This brings us to the sustainability indicators. Since generational accounting is a
decomposition of the primary balance PBt in the RHS of (1), it is easily seen that (1)
can be rewritten as:
Bt ¼
X
k t
Nt;k
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
current generations
þ
X
k [ t
Nt;k
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
future generations
¼ CUt þ FUt;
ð7Þ
where CUt denotes the sum of the discounted future primary balances of the cur-
rently living generations, and FUt the corresponding concept for the future gener-
ations that are not yet born in year t.
A first way to express the unsustainability in the long run is by observing that the
intertemporal budget constraint (7) can be written as:
Bt  CUt þ FUtð Þ ¼ 0: ð8Þ
The left hand side of Eq. (8) is denoted IPLt in the following and stands for the
intertemporal public liabilities. They consist of explicit (gross) debt (Bt), future
assets (or liabilities) incurred by net tax payments of currently living generations
(CUt), and future assets (or liabilities) incurred by net tax payments of future
generations (FUt).
A sustainability gap will reveal itself as
IPLt ¼ Bt  CUt þ FUtð Þ[ 0: ð9Þ
We calculate the actual IPLt by using future liabilities incurred by net taxes of the
future generations FUt under the assumption that current and future generations face
the same fiscal policy. We report the value of these intertemporal public liabilities
relative to the present value of all future GDP.6 Assuming that output per worker
increases over time with the productivity growth x, we project future GDP by
multiplying output per worker, which grows with the rate of productivity, with the
projected workforce in the future, which we retrieve from the demographic
projection.
An alternative way to express the violation of the intertemporal budget
constraint, consists in expressing the adjustment needed in the discounted future
primary balances of the future generations (FUt in Eq. (7)) to restore the equality of
Eq. (8). We denote this required adjustment as
6 In some papers, e.g. Raffelhu¨schen (1999a, b), these intertemporal public liabilities are presented
relative to current GDP. However, we prefer to present liabilities relative to the present value of all future
GDP’s, as is done in e.g. studies of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). This way of representing the
sustainability problem allows us to compare sustainability gaps between different countries with other
population evolutions. Different population projections influence the future ability of countries to face the
sustainability problem. Working with the present value of all future GDP’s takes this caveat into account.
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FUt ¼ Bt  CUt: ð10Þ
Indicator FUt expresses how the primary surpluses of all future generations have to
be adjusted to comply with the intertemporal budget constraint, given the primary
surpluses induced by the current fiscal policy for the currently living generations
over the rest of their lifetime. This indicator is easily calculated, since one only
needs information about the current debt level, and about the generational accounts
of currently living generations.
Implicitly FUt also defines an adjustment in the generational accounts of the
future generations, GAt;k, with k [ t.
7 In practice one mostly assumes that net tax
payments of all future generations are adjusted proportionately:
ss;k ¼ k:ss;k; ð11Þ
with the factor k now measuring the degree of unsustainability.
In Sect. 4 we will not report this adjustment factor k, but compare the GA of a
newborn in base period t (GAt,t) with the fiscally sustainable GA of newborn in
period t ? 1 (GAt;tþ1). The difference between GAt,t and GA

t;tþ1, is called
‘generational imbalance’. If this difference is positive, public finances are untenable
in the long run: future generations will have to pay higher net taxes to satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint.
3 Data requirements and availability
The method of generational accounting requires population projections reflecting
future demographic changes, a base year government budget preferably decom-
posed into different types of expenditures and revenues, age-profiles to allocate
these net taxes across age groups (or cohorts), and assumptions about productivity
growth and discount rates.
We use the official population projections for 2007–2060 of the Federal
Planning Office and the National Institute of Statistics. In order to accommodate
the infinite time horizon of the GA-methodology to the finite horizon in these
projections, we first truncate the calculations after 200 years (in 2310) and add the
remainder term, as described in Hagist et al. (2009a, b) to account for the infinite
horizon. Hagist et al. (2009a, b) suggest applying the same parameters of the
official population projections of the base year to extend these population forecasts.
However, as we have no access to the demographic model underlying the official
population projections, we were forced to adopt an alternative solution. Since we
wanted to properly integrate the increased life expectancy of all generations living
in base year 2010, and since we assumed a maximum age of 105 years, we first
extrapolated the official demographic projections from 2060 up to 2115. We did
this by calculating the average yearly growth rate in population for different
7 See Decoster et al. (2011) for details on the link between FUt and the GA

t;k’s.
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subgroups between 2055 and 2060.8 These growth rates are then used to extend the
population projections up to 2115. As such, we assume that the evolution of the
population between 2060 and 2115 follows a similar pattern as the evolution
between 2055 and 2060.9 Second, we assume a constant population between 2115
and 2310.
Figure 1 summarizes the population projections by means of one crucial statistic:
the dependency ratio, defined as the ratio between the sum of age groups 0–16 and
older than 65 in the numerator over the age groups 17–65 in the denominator. We
display the region specific projections to show that ageing is not uniformly spread
over the three Belgian regions. Both the level of the dependency ratio and its
increase are higher in Flanders and Wallonia than in Brussels. In Sect. 5 we
investigate the consequences of this differential demographic change across the
regions within a regionalized generational accounting framework.
To clean the base year government budget from cyclical components, we started
from the observation by the Belgian High Council of Finances (2011) that in base
year 2010, the structural Belgian primary balance was break-even, and amounted to
structural revenues and primary expenditures of 46.8 % of GDP (or 165 billion €).10
On the revenue side, we adjusted all categories of actual revenues proportionately
(keeping their share in total revenues constant), such that total revenues amounted to
46.8 % of GDP.11 At the expenditure side, we only cleaned unemployment benefits,
sickness and disability benefits, and early retirement benefits from their cyclical
Fig. 1 Dependency ratio for the three Belgian regions. Source Federal Planning Office (2010) own
calculations
8 We calculated these growth rates for the following age-groups: 0–11, 12–18, 19–25, 26–45, 46–55 year
and 65?.
9 As a sensitivity analysis, we have checked whether the results change significantly when using a
different time interval than 2055–2060. The results remained relatively constant.
10 The non cyclically adjusted primary deficit was 1 % of GDP in 2010.
11 This is a simplification, the cyclical component being obviously different for indirect taxes, corporate
taxes, or social security contributions. Sensitivity analysis regarding this assumption showed that it had no
significant impact on the results.
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component. Table 1 shows the result. We decomposed revenues into 6 different
categories, and primary expenditures into 9 groups.
Revenues and expenditures from Table 1 need to be allocated across age groups.
In contrast to many other studies which calculate generational accounts, we retrieve
age-specific profiles for different taxes and expenditures as much as possible from
microdata to microsimulation models.
For social security contributions, sickness and disability benefits, unemployment
and pension benefits, we generated gender specific age-profiles by using the
microsimulation model MIMOSIS.12 This model also generated age-profiles for
personal income taxes. This age profile was not gender specific since the personal
income tax liability is calculated at the household level. We therefore assumed the
age-profile for personal income taxes to be the same for men and women. Age-
profiles for indirect taxes were generated by an indirect tax extension of the
microsimulation model EUROMOD, based on the household budget survey of
2003.13
We did not succeed in updating the age profiles for capital and corporate
taxation, compared to the ones used in Dellis and Lu¨th (1999), and hence continued
to use these profiles. The Vademecum of Financial and Statistical information about
Social Security in Belgium of the Federal Public Service Social Security of 2011
gives a detailed overview of the gender specific distribution across age groups of
health-care expenditures. The age-profiles for family allowances are retrieved from
Table 1 Belgian structural receipts and expenditures in 2010 (in million €)
Revenues % GDP
2010
Expenditures %GDP
2010
Capital taxation 2,388 0.7 Wages public sector 32,696 9.3
Income taxation 42,927 12.2 Birth allowances 127 0.0
Corporate taxation 9,703 2.8 Family allowances 5,767 1.6
Indirect taxation 43,598 12.3 Education 15,804 4.5
Social security contributions 47,925 13.6 Health-care 24,514 7.0
Non-fiscal non-parafiscal
revenues
18,462 5.2 Sickness and disability
benefits
4,313 1.2
Unemployment benefits 5,580 1.6
Pension benefits 29,221 8.3
Other expenditures 46,981 13.3
Total 165,003 46.8 165,003 46.8
Source National Bank of Belgium, Higher Council of Finances
12 MIMOSIS stands for Microsimulation Model for Belgian Social Insurance Systems, a microsimulation
model developed at the University of Leuven (CES), University of Lie`ge (CREPP) and the University of
Antwerp (CSB) in partnership with, and funded by FPS Social Security and Federal Science Policy. The
model is based on administrative data for more than 300,000 individuals and 100,000 households from
2001 and is now in use and maintained by FPS Social Security. For more information, see Decoster et al.
(2007) or http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/.
13 See Decoster et al. (2009), Decoster et al. (2010), and Sutherland et al. (2009) for details of this
extension of EUROMOD.
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the website of the Federal Service of Family Allowances. The age-profile for birth
allowances is straightforward, since the amount can be imputed directly to the
newborn. The age-profile for educational expenditures is based on data available
from the Flemish and French communities. Finally, we did not try to allocate
‘‘Wages in the public sector’’, ‘‘Other expenditures’’ and ‘‘Non-fiscal and non-
parafiscal revenues’’ to specific age groups. We distributed these categories
uniformly across all age groups. The resulting age-specific averages for all
expenditures and revenues of Table 1 and for base year 2010 are shown in the
appendix.
In line with the literature, we make the assumption that age-profiles remain
constant over time. This certainly is a simplification, since the effect of increased
female participation in the labour market e.g., and the resulting higher pension
entitlements, are not yet reflected in the 2010 age profiles of pension benefits. In
future research this assumption could e.g. be relaxed by relying on dynamic
microsimulation models.
In the baseline scenario we assume a discount rate of 3 % and an annual
productivity growth per capita of 1.5 %, the rate used by the Ageing Commission in
its 2010 report. Growth is assumed to be constant over time and used to uprate all
net taxes according to Eq. (11). We make one exception though. Known as the
‘‘Newhouse conjecture’’—see Newhouse (1992)—health-care costs per capita grow
faster than real growth, due to medical technological progress. To account for this,
we calibrated the growth rate of health care expenditures on the one of the 2010
report of the Ageing Commission.14 This led to a growth rate of 2.2 % per year, or
0.7 percentage points higher than the productivity growth of 1.5 %.15 We examine
the robustness of our results with respect to the assumptions about discount factor
and growth rate by conducting a sensitivity analysis.
4 Generational accounts at the Belgian level
This section presents the gender specific generational accounts for Belgium in base
year 2010 in the first subsection. We then apply these GA’s to investigate the long
term sustainability of Belgian public finances. In the third subsection we quantify
the relative contribution of explicit debt, of ageing and of employment on fiscal
sustainability.
4.1 Generational accounts for Belgium in 2010
Table 2 displays the gender specific generational accounts for the currently living
generations in Belgium in 2010. We first focus on the first row of the table: the GA
14 Using our population projections and assumed real growth, we calculated the average percentage point
adjustment for health care expenditure, needed to reproduce the projected evolution of health care cost as
a share of GDP by the Ageing Commission. For another study that includes an increased health care cost
per capita growth rate, see Hagist et al. (2005).
15 To avoid health care costs exceeding the level of GDP, we also impose that from 2050 onwards, health
care costs again grow in line with productivity growth.
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for a newborn. In line with results for many other Western countries, the GA for
newborns in the base year is negative: on average €-143,786.
The difference between both genders is striking, and again in line with findings in
other studies (see for example Bonin 2000). For a male newborn the present value of
what he gets from the government exceeds the present value of taxes and
contributions he pays by €79,097. The female shortfall is almost three times that
large: €-211.665.
To assess the relative importance of the expected demographic evolution and of
the age-profiles of taxes and benefits in this gender difference, we simulated the
female GA under the assumption that both genders had the same, male, age profile.
This amounts to remove all differences between men and women (e.g. participation
rates, average wages and hence contributions, etc.), except for longer female life
expectancy in the baseline, and the divergent projected increase in life expectancy.
The results are displayed in the fourth column of Table 2. The substantial reduction
of the female GA of -211,665 to -120,938 reveals that the initial difference was
mainly driven by the different age-profiles, which are primarily related to
participation rates on the labour market. Gender specific demographics are only
partially responsible for the gender difference in the GA’s.
We also decomposed the generational accounts into specific revenue and
expenditure categories to gain further insight into the sources of this gender
difference.16 The results confirm the above result that the gender difference is
mainly driven by the age-profiles. A female newborn expects to pay 45 % less
social security contributions than a male newborn (€154,850 instead of €280,006).
On the expenditure side the average lifetime health-care expenditure is higher for
women than for men.17
Moving down the other rows in Table 2, the ‘rest of life’ generational account
increases and becomes positive at the age of 8 for men and 17 for women. It reaches
a maximum of €211,706 for men and €37,912 for women at the age of 23. From that
Table 2 Generational accounts for Belgium 2010 (in €)
Age GA male GA female GA representative
individual
GA female with same
age profile as men
0 (newborn) -79,097 -211,665 -143,786 -120,938
5 -25,810 -169,400 -95,751 -73,116
15 125,673 -40,226 45,018 75,270
30 132,586 -21,463 56,147 62,012
45 -126,702 -200,877 -163,388 -211,783
60 -331,666 -318,749 -325,175 -428,727
75 -233,986 -254,026 -245,272 -303,898
90 -120,162 -137,586 -132,876 -131,605
16 Tables with the decomposition are available from the authors upon request.
17 Average health-care costs are higher for women around the age of 25, which is explained by
pregnancy related expenses. But also higher life expectancy of women translates into more health-care
costs than for men.
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age on, expected educational expenditures and family allowances decline and the
present value of future income taxes and social security contributions dominate
future old age benefits. From the age of 23 onwards, the GA decreases as the
number of years the individual is expected to work shrinks and pension benefits
approach in time. The GA already turns negative at the age of 29 for women and at
38 for men. It reaches a minimum at the age of 61 and then starts to increase again
since life expectancy declines.
Note that the forward looking assumption of generational accounting makes the
figures from Table 2 not comparable across different age groups (hence, across the
rows of one column). Since the accounts only measure the average amount of net
taxes a representative individual of a given age group has to pay for its remaining
lifetime, they only reveal intra-generational differences in the net tax burden of
different subgroups, e.g. men and women.
Contrary to what is often thought, the negative generational accounts for a
newborn in Table 2 does not answer the question whether Belgian public finances
are sustainable in the long run. Table 2 merely illustrates the impact of current
policy on currently living generations in Belgium. True, the negative account for a
newborn might sound an alarm. But if future demographic evolutions and/or
economic growth are favourable enough, the negative GA for a newborn in Table 2
might still be compatible with long-term sustainability. In the next subsection we
therefore integrate the GA’s into sustainability indicators.
4.2 Sustainability of Belgian public finances
Table 3 displays the sustainability indicators derived by using the generational
accounts of Table 2 in combination with the assumptions on growth and the long-
term demographic projections.
The first indicator concerns the intertemporal public liabilities (IPLt) of Eq. (9).
This consists of explicit debt in 2010 (Bt), plus all liabilities (or assets) incurred by
net tax payments of currently living generations (CUt) and future liabilities (or
assets) incurred by the net tax payments of future generations (FUt), under the
crucial assumption that current and future generations face the same fiscal policy. In
2010, explicit government debt was equal to €341 billion, or approximately 97 % of
GDP. Under current policy total implicit debt converges to €2 507 billion, leading to
Table 3 Summary of the fiscal
stance of Belgium under policy
of base year 2010
Explicit debt (billion €): Bt 341
Implicit debt (billion €): CUt ? FUt 2,507
IPL (billion €): IPLt 2,848
IPL (% of present value of future GDP) 11.5
IPL (% of current GDP) 808
GA of a representative newborn in 2010 (€): GAt,t -143,786
GA of future newborn to return to sustainable finances
(€): GAt;tþ1
181,020
Intergenerational gap (€): GAt;tþ1 - GAt,t 324,806
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a total of €2,848 billion in intertemporal public liabilities. Being different from
zero, this clearly reveals a violation of the intertemporal budget constraint, and
hence unsustainable Belgian public finances in the long run.
In the literature, these implicit liabilities are expressed in two different ways. The
first one, introduced by Raffelhu¨schen (1999a, b) and in line with the concept of
explicit debt, displays IPL against current GDP. In that case total Belgian
intertemporal public liabilities are equal to 808 % of current baseline GDP.
However, this way of expressing the indicator is often criticized for two reasons. The
first is the arbitrariness of the length of the time period used for the flow concept
when linking a stock and a flow concept.18 Secondly, it does not take into account
future growth prospects. It seems more sensible to report intertemporal public
liabilities in terms of the present value of the sum of all future GDP’s. Applied to our
baseline results, we get an IPL which amounts to 11.5 % of projected GDP.19
The second way to express long run sustainability consists in looking at the
required adjustment in net contributions of future generations to satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint, see Eq. (10). This future GA can be compared to
the generational account of a newborn in 2010, since we then compare individuals
over their entire life span. Table 3 shows that a future newborn will have to pay net
taxes of €181,020 to restore the intertemporal budget constraint. The intergener-
ational imbalance consists of the comparison of this future generational account
with the one of the newborn of 2010. Given current policy and the need for
sustainable public finances in the long run necessitates future generations to pay
€324,806 more taxes than a current newborn.20
We stress that this generational imbalance, as informative as it may be, is only a
first step, albeit a necessary one, in the more comprehensive discussion about
intergenerational equity. In this paper, we do not introduce any normative
framework to express value judgements and trade-offs of welfare for, choices by,
or resources available to subsequent generations. Therefore, any interpretation of
this generational imbalance as ‘unjust’, is overstretching the framework in which
this result has been obtained.
As Haveman (1994) pointed out, these results might be sensitive to assumptions
about discount and growth rates. Therefore, Table 8 in the appendix presents a
18 This is analogous to the arbitrariness of considering 100 % of GDP as an alarming level of debt. When
choosing quarterly levels of GDP, the same nominal debt level is expressed as 400 %, and when choosing
a two-year period, the debt level will be 50 %. The only value of linking a stock variable to the flow
variable GDP, is that it enhances cross country and temporal comparisons with varying GDP’s.
19 Another, slightly different, indicator consists in the calculation of the immediate and permanent
increase in the primary balance in order to return to sustainability. Our results (not displayed in Table 2)
show that to return to long term sustainability, the primary balance should be improved permanently with
11.5 percentage points. A similar indicator is frequently used by the European Commission, under the
concept of S2-indicator which equals 5.3 for 2009 (European Commission 2009). However, as stated in
Benz and Fetzer (2006), the OECD-method that is used by the European Commission differs from the
generational accounting framework. This discrepancy might serve as a partial explanation why the S2-
indicator differs from the result in our work.
20 Our results are in line with the ones obtained by Hagist et al. (2009a) who analyse the fiscal stance of
Austria in 2005. The generational account of a newborn equals €-130,000, and the future generational
account needed to restore sustainability equals €239,900, leading to an intergenerational gap of €369,900.
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sensitivity analysis in which we vary the growth rate from 1.25 to 1.75 %, and the
discount rate from 2 to 5 %. The intertemporal public liabilities in terms of the
present value of the sum al all future GDP’s fluctuates between 9.9 and 14.4 %. The
assessment of unsustainable Belgian public finances does clearly not hinge upon the
specific growth rate and discount rate used in Table 3.
For policymakers, it may be interesting to see the composition of these implicit
liabilities. Table 4 decomposes the implicit liabilities by the different revenue and
expenditure categories. The difference between total revenues (53.3 %) and
expenditures (64.8 %) in percentage of the present value of the sum of all future
GDP equals the IPL-indicator from Table 3, 11.5 %. In comparison with their share
of GDP of base year 2010, total revenues increase with 7.4 percentage points whereas
total expenditures increase with 17.9 percentage points. In the rightmost column of
Table 4 we show the share of each component in the total percentage point change of
revenues and expenditures. The increase in revenues can be mainly assigned to
changes in indirect taxation (32.2 %) and income taxes (23.9 %). Increasing health
care costs (37.7 %) are a more important factor than pensions (30.8 %).
4.3 Main determinants of the unsustainable public finances
In this section, we investigate the main determinants of the unsustainability of the
previous section, by simulating counterfactuals. Table 5 summarizes the results of
four simulations.
Table 4 Share revenues and expenditures GDP 2010 and present value all GDP
% GDP
2010
% Present
value all GDP
Difference
(pct. points)
Share in total change
revenue or expenditure
Capital taxation 0.7 1.0 ?0.3 3.8
Income taxation 12.2 14.0 ?1.8 23.9
Corporate taxation 2.8 3.1 ?0.4 5.3
Indirect taxation 12.3 14.8 ?2.4 32.2
Social security contributions 13.6 15.0 ?1.4 19.0
Non-fiscal non-parafiscal revenues 5.2 5.4 ?1.2 15.9
Total revenues 46.8 53.3 ?7.4 100
Wages public sector 9.3 11.4 ?2.1 11.6
Birth allowances 0.0 0.0 ?0.0 0.1
Family allowances 1.6 1.8 ?0.1 0.7
Education 4.5 5.2 ?0.7 3.9
Health-care 7.0 13.7 ?6.8 37.7
Sickness and disability benefits 1.2 1.4 ?0.2 1.1
Unemployment benefits 1.6 1.1 -0.4 2.4
Pension benefits 8.3 13.8 ?5.5 30.8
Other 13.3 16.3 ?3.0 16.7
Total Expenditures 46.8 64.8 ?17.9 100.0
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Since Belgian public finances have been characterized by one of the largest
explicit debts in the European Union for several decades, it is often put forward that
the current fiscal imbalance is due to this ‘burden of the past’. Indeed, in 2010, the
Belgian government faced an explicit debt of 97 % of GDP. The first simulation
analyses how sustainability is affected in the counterfactual where there would be
no explicit debt. Table 5 shows that, expressed relative to future GDP, intertemporal
public liabilities would decline from 11.5 % in the baseline to 10.1 %. Hence, only
12.1 % of the sustainability gap can be attributed to the current debt level.
In the second counterfactual, we isolate the effect of ageing by removing the
demographic change from the calculations of the GA’s. We hold the age structure of
the 2010 population constant. Table 5 shows that the sustainability problem
expressed in percentage of the present value of future GDP is now substantially
reduced from 11.5 to 2.7 %. This means that 8.8 percentage points out of the long
run imbalance of 11.5 % (or 76.5 %) can be assigned to demographic changes.
In the third simulation we remove the more than proportional increase in per
capita health expenditures. This shows that only 19.1 % of the sustainability gap can
be attributed to this factor.
Finally, we used the comparative advantage of our microsimulation tools to
simulate the effect of an increase in employment on the generational accounts. In
line with one of the goals of the Lisbon Strategy, we analyzed the improvement of
public finances when the employment of elderly workers increases. We simulate the
effect on government revenues and expenditures due to this increase in employ-
ment, by means of the microsimulation model MEFISTO running on the micro data
of the Belgian database of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC).21,22
Table 5 Fiscal sustainability (IPL as % of future GDP) for simulated counterfactuals
IPL in % of
future GDP
Relative
importance (%)
Baseline 11.5 100.0
No explicit debt 10.1 12.1
No ageing 2.7 76.5
No increased health-care costs 9.3 19.1
Employment rate age group 50–65 from 41 to 50 % 10.3 10.4
Employment rate age group 50–65 from 41 to 70 % 6.1 47.0
21 MEFISTO is a tax benefit calculator which calculates for each household the net disposable income,
corresponding to gross income components under given tax and benefit rules. It is an expanded version of
the Belgian module of EUROMOD, as developed in the SBO-project ‘‘FLEMOSI: A tool for ex ante
evaluation of socio-economic policies in Flanders’’, funded by IWT Flanders. For more details on the
FLEMOSI-project, see www.flemosi.be. For more information on the original EUROMOD-model, see
Sutherland (2001) and https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/.
22 EU-SILC is based on a two-step sampling procedure and representative for the Belgian population in
private households (persons living in collective households and in institutions are excluded from the
target population). The data used here were collected in the second half of 2006 and contain information
on income received in 2005. The sample consists of 5,860 households or 14,329 individuals.
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According to the EU-SILC data, the employment rate of elderly workers
(50–65 year) was approximately 41 % in 2005. This is low compared to other EU-
countries. For example, the employment rate of elderly in 2005 equals 44 % in
Austria, 51 % in France, 54 % in the Netherlands and 62 % in the United Kingdom
(see Zaida 2007). We therefore considered it sensible to investigate the effect on
sustainability of increasing the employment rate at least up to 50 % for this age
group. We also pushed the employment rate to the much higher level of 70 %.
To carry out the simulation, we randomly draw people from the labour force
between 50 and 65 years old who are either inactive, unemployed or pensioned.
Assuming they work full time, we calculated their gross income, and reduced their
unemployment or pension payments to zero.23 MEFISTO produces their corre-
sponding disposable income, and hence also the taxes and social security
contributions they pay. The microsimulation exercise reveals that the increase in
the employment rate of elderly to 50 and 70 % leads to an increase in personal
income tax revenue of respectively 3.0 and 11.1 %, an increase in social security
contributions of 5.3 and 18.6 %, a decrease in pension payments of 3.4 and 15.1 %,
and a decrease in unemployment benefits of 4.5 and 12.2 %.
We then translate this increased employment rate of the age group 50–65 into the
age-profiles of taxes and expenditures and recalculate the GA’s and the sustain-
ability indicators. The last two rows of Table 5 show that the necessary adjustment
in terms of GDP decreases from 11.5 to 10.3 % when the activity rate goes up to
50 %, and nearly halves to 6.1 % with an employment rate of 70 %. Mainly the
latter is a substantial reduction of the sustainability gap. But even in that very
optimistic scenario, more policy changes are needed to tackle long term fiscal
unsustainability.
5 Regional generational accounts
In this section we derive the gender specific generational accounts for the three
Belgian regions, i.e. Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels to investigate the long run
budgetary impact of the region specific demographic evolution shown in Fig. 1. We
therefore assigned as much as possible revenues and expenditures from Table 1 to
residents by regions, construct region-specific age profiles, and used region specific
population projections. Note that this does not amount to the construction of
regional budgets with a complete picture of regional revenues and expenditures, as
determined by regional tax and expenditures competences, and by the Belgian
Special Finance Act which determines grants to regions and communities. Instead,
we directly decompose revenues and expenditures on the basis of the residence of
23 In order to assign these people gross wages, an hourly gross wage is essential. However, the EU-SILC
does not report an hourly wage for people who are not working at the time of the survey. We therefore
estimated and imputed an hourly wage by means of a Heckman selection model (see Decoster and
Vanleenhove 2012).
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the individual or household. Therefore we will only report regionalized GA’s in this
section, and not sustainability indicators, comparable to the Belgian ones in Table 3.
To allocate the Belgian aggregate expenditures and revenues from Table 1 to the
three regions, we mainly used the microsimulation model MIMOSIS, since the
micro-data of this model to contain a region identifier at the individual level. For
capital taxes, corporate taxes, indirect taxation and ‘‘other contributions’’, no
regionalized information was available, and we distributed them in proportion to
regional population size. Second, if available from micro data, we calculated
regionalized gender specific age profiles for each revenue and expenditure
component. If not, we use the gender specific age profiles from the Belgium
case.24 Finally, we inserted region specific population projection of the Federal
Planning Bureau and the National Institute of Statistics from 2007 to 2060 and
extended these to 2310 in a similar way as for the Belgium population. Since there is
no gender-specific projection at the regional level, we transplanted the gender
projection of the total Belgian population into the regional population projections.25
Analogous to the calculations for Belgium in the previous section, we assume an
annual growth rate of productivity of 1.5 %, except for health-care expenditures,
and a discount rate of 3 %.
Table 6 shows generational accounts for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. It
reveals how different the generational accounts are for the regions. Under current
policy, and—more importantly—given the current age profiles of different taxes and
expenditures, reflecting the current socio-economic situation in the regions, a
representative newborn in Wallonia is expected to receive on average almost
€175,000 more than a Flemish newborn over their expected lifetime. Between
Flanders and Brussels the difference at the level of newborns is much smaller. The
age pattern of the GA’s is similar for all three regions and comparable to what we
found in the Belgian generational accounts.
Since regional differences in GA’s might be caused by both differences in age
profiles and different demographic evolutions, we have, in line with the discussion
at the Belgian level in Table 2, simulated the GA of Wallonia and Brussels under
24 We could produce region specific age profiles for personal income taxes, social security contributions,
sickness-disability benefits, unemployment benefits and pensions.
25 The regional decomposition of expenditures and revenues, as well as the regionalized age profiles can
be obtained from the authors upon request.
Table 6 Generational accounts
by region (in Euro)
Age Flanders Wallonia Brussels
0 -112,918 -288,750 -124,140
15 84,023 -106,296 56,837
30 79,961 -73,427 60,739
45 -177,040 -234,017 -112,755
60 -355,945 -354,126 -312,049
75 -257,070 -268,192 -273,464
90 -139,240 -140,018 -145,597
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the assumption of a similar age profile as in Flanders. The result is displayed in the
second row of Table 7.
Removing differences in age profiles of net taxes and only keeping differences in
demographic projections leads to a drastic change in the regional GA’s. The
counterfactual GA for a representative Walloon individual is now almost the same
as the one for a Flemish newborn. The difference between both accounts reduces
from €175,832 in the baseline to only €17,470. This clearly illustrates that the large
difference in the baseline GA for Flanders and Wallonia is almost entirely due to the
current socio-economic situation in Wallonia, as reflected in the age-profiles. The
improvement in the Brussels GA when using the Flanders age profile for taxes and
expenditures is even more spectacular and can be explained by divergent regional
migration patterns. As shown in a study commissioned by the Flemish government
(Sum Research 2006), the migration pattern for Brussels is different than the other
two regions. The Brussels region is confronted with a positive net migration of
people of working age and a negative net migration of elderly. As such, relatively
few benefits such as pension or health care must be paid in Brussels in comparison
with the amount of taxes collected from the active working population. This
migration pattern is not observed in the other two regions and explains why we see
this improvement in the counterfactual GA for Brussels when removing all socio-
economic factors.
The predominance of socio-economic factors in the explanation of regional
differences in the GA’s is confirmed by simulation of a counterfactual in which we
remove ageing from the demographic projections (row 3 in Table 7) After all,
Table 4 revealed that ageing is the main determinant of unsustainable Belgian
public finances and Fig. 1 showed a clear regional pattern in the change of the
dependency ratio. Removing ageing from the demographic projection leads to an
improvement in the GA for Flanders of €85,106 (the difference between -112,918
in the first row and 27,812 in the third row of Table 7). For Brussels the GA
improves by €76,266, whereas the change in GA for Wallonia is equal to €134,988
(the difference between -288,750 and -153,762). This larger effect for Wallonia
can be explained by the fact that ageing is more challenging in Wallonia, as can be
seen in Fig. 1. The regional difference in GA remains however large in comparison
to the simulation in which each regions faces the same Flemish socio-economic
situation. Therefore, far more important than regional differences in demographic
projections is the regional difference in socio-economic situation. This also shows
Table 7 Counterfactual simulations of regional generational accounts
Flanders Wallonia Brussels
Baseline 2010 -112,918 -288,750 -124,140
All regions have Flanders age-profile for net taxes -112,918 -130,388 -29,447
No ageing 27,812 -153,762 -47,874
No ageing, all regions have Flanders age-profile 27,812 16,068 59,146
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up in the GA of a Flemish newborn turning positive when neutralizing the effect of
ageing.
Hence, given the previous two simulations, it does not come as a surprise that all
three regional GA’s turn positive when we simultaneously remove the ageing
component and endow Wallonia and Brussels with the Flemish age profiles of net
taxes. The results are in the bottom row of Table 7. Compared to the difference in
the generational account of a newborn in the second row of Table 7, i.e. €17,470
between Flanders and Wallonia, the difference between the two regions decreases
further (€11,744). This does indeed illustrate that the demographic evolution and
more specifically the ageing of the population, is more challenging in Wallonia than
in Flanders. But this effect is relatively small compared to the effect of socio-
economic factors, reflected in the age-profiles of net taxes. This holds a fortiori for
the Brussels region.
6 Conclusion
Since the financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis, fiscal imbalances are in
the centre of the public debate. With fiscal deficit and debt level forecasts of
respectively -3.1 and 100.5 % for 2012 Belgium is not an exception to this general
picture. There is no doubt that these figures deserve attention. But an exclusive and
frenetic focus on these cyclical and short term problems threatens to conceal the
long term picture of structural and long term fiscal imbalances. It is well known that
the current deficit and explicit debt ratio only measure annual flows of expenditures
and receipts. They ignore future liabilities such as future pension entitlements and
health care costs which, due to an ageing population, are going to increase
substantially in the near future. As an alternative or complementary way of looking
at the fiscal stance of countries, Auerbach et al. (1991) introduced the method of
generational accounting.
This paper derived generational accounts for Belgium using data of 2010, and
can be considered an update for Belgium of earlier work by Dellis and Lu¨th (1999)
and Stijns (1999). We also introduced some new elements and improvements. First,
we made use of microdata and microsimulation models to derive gender specific age
profiles of the most important taxes and benefits. Secondly, we determined the
relative contribution of the most important factors of long run unsustainability by
simulation of counterfactuals, such as the removal of initial debt, ageing or
increased employment rates. For the latter we again made use of microsimulation
techniques. Finally we disentangled Belgian generational accounts into regional
accounts for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels.
In line with other studies which investigate the long run sustainability of Belgian
public finances (e.g. Saintrain 2010), we conclude that current fiscal policy, when
confronted with the demographic change ahead, violates the intertemporal
government budget constraint. According to our calculations Belgium faces a long
term structural deficit of 11.5 % of future GDP. Contrary to what is often put
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forward in public debates, the current level of explicit debt only plays a minor role
in explaining this sustainability problem. Ageing and the related increase in age
related expenditures are the main drivers of the long run fiscal imbalance and the
high level of implicit debt. Only 12.1 % of the sustainability gap can be attributed to
explicit debt, whereas 76.5 % of the challenge is due to ageing.
The regionalized generational accounts revealed that lower participation rates
and higher unemployment in Wallonia translate into an average Walloon newborn
to receive almost three times as much from the government than an average
newborn in Flanders. In Brussels, a more favourable demographic outlook
compensates an equally adverse socio-economic situation. Our simulations showed
that regional differences are to found primarily in the age-profiles, reflecting wide
differences in the regional socio-economic situations.
As pointed out by Haveman (1994), the method of generational accounting
has some major drawbacks. The results are obtained in a purely arithmetic
framework, which means that, unlike in a genuine economic model, no
economic interactions are taken into account. The methodology only summarizes
the combination of current budgetary and social policy with future demographic
evolution in an accounting framework. Therefore, the results presented in this
paper should not be read as a ‘prediction’. Indeed, we do know with certainty
that both current policy and the economic environment will change in the years,
let alone decades, ahead.
We are even more firm in our warning not to interpret these results as pointing
towards intergenerational injustice. For that purpose one needs an elaborated
normative framework to trade-off welfare between different generations. Economic
growth, further increases in longevity and uncertainty are but some elements which
make this framework far from obvious and certainly beyond the scope of this paper.
However, these caveats do not make our calculations of generational accounts less
valuable. They can serve as an indispensable input to these other models, and feed
an informed normative debate. Moreover, we hope that these the results help to
advocate a shift of attention of policymakers from the current short term deficit to
the real long term structural challenges.
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